Currently released so far... 5268 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04BRASILIA3154, F-X FIGHTER PROGRAM TO END WITH A WHIMPER ON NEW
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRASILIA3154.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04BRASILIA3154 | 2004-12-22 18:06 | 2010-12-21 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 003154
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014
TAGS: MCAP MARR MASS PREL BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: F-X FIGHTER PROGRAM TO END WITH A WHIMPER ON NEW
YEAR'S DAY
REF: BRASILIA 2890
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Philip Chicola, reasons
1.4 (b &
d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At midnight, December 31st, Brazil's F-X
jet fighter competition will come to an end. Ultimately, a
decision on the costly program proved to be politically
untenable for the Lula administration. Given all the urgent
requirements of Brazil's armed forces, the F-X was an expense
that was hard to justify. Competitors for the F-X are
refusing to go down quietly, but they are fighting a losing
battle. With the end of the F-X, the GOB may review whether
to purchase less costly used aircraft. In this regard, the
Lockheed Martin F-16 would have the inside track. However,
it is possible that the GOB may base a decision on used F-16s
in the context of its continued questions about the U.S. as a
reliable supplier. End Summary
The F-X Program, RIP
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) On December 31, the Best and Final Offers (BOFAs)
for the competition to select Brazil's new generation high
performance jet fighter (F-X) will expire. Despite repeated
GOB postponements during the past 12 months on a decision,
the F-X program had still retained a breath of life thanks to
repeated hints from former Defense Minister Viegas that a F-X
award decision would be forthcoming. Throughout the process,
however, the Lula administration was reluctant to commit to a
choice. With the end of the validity of the BOFAs next week,
the F-X program will be officially dead.
¶3. (SBU) The principal cause of the program's demise, most
observers agree, was the F-X program's steep price tag,
around $700 million plus for the purchase of a dozen high
performance aircraft. The huge cost, at a time when the Lula
administration was engaged in fiscal austerity, made the
program a politically impossible sell. (Note: The Brazilian
Congress, which still has not concluded the 2005 budget, has
not included jet fighters in its budget, and, in fact,
provides very little money overall for defense. End Note.)
Yet, until November, more than a few senior Brazilian Air
Force (FAB) officers held out hope that FAB would get its new
jets. When Russian President Putin departed Brazil last
month without a deal in place for the Sukhoi SU-35 -- after
offering to purchase 50 Embraer commercial aircraft as a deal
sweetener and certainly dangling a possible agreement on
ending the Russian embargo on Brazilian beef -- the last best
chance for new fighter aircraft for FAB left with him
(reftel).
¶4. (SBU) Other factors contributed to the F-X impasse. The
Brazilian military's almost insatiable need for weapons
systems upgrade and procurement required that the GOB triage
the competing demands for funding. FAB already had been
granted approval for buying ten new Black Hawk helicopters
(about $153 million). With both the army and navy biting at
FAB's heels for funding their own urgent requirements, the
new jet fighters became a harder sell.
¶5. (SBU) In view of the lack of any perceived threat, the
strategic question of whether Brazil needed the F-X whose
primary purpose was protection of the national capital, has
received relatively little debate. The program itself
ultimately owed its continued rationale less to the defense
of Brasilia than as a tool of national pride, particularly
following Chile's purchase of F-16s. Even some air force
generals admit the principal current threat to Brazilian
sovereignty (from narco-trafficers) can be addressed less
expensively by other air force elements such as FAB's Super
Tucanos.
¶6. (SBU) Meanwhile, F-X competitors are refusing to go down
without a fight. Planted news articles in praise of one
aircraft or attacking another (usually the F-16, and the
alleged, and false, denial by the USG to provide AAMRAM
capability to Brazil) continue to pop up. The most recent
example of F-X muckraking is a cover story this week in
left-leaning nationalist magazine Carta Capital in praise of
the Mirage 2000 of the Embraer-Dassault consortium. In the
Carta Capital article, Embraer President Mauricio Botelho, in
a direct swipe at Lockheed-Martin, is quoted as saying that
because the USG won't allow it, U.S. companies offer "no
chance" for transfer of military-related technology -- a
bizarre comment in the wake of the winning
Embraer--Lockheed-Martin bid for the development of the U.S.
Army's Aerial Common Sensor System aircraft. Even Sweden's
Grippen aircraft has received high profile lobbying with a
prominent billboard at the entrance to Brasilia airport.
Used Aircraft?
--------------
¶7. (SBU) Throughout much of the long-running F-X
competition -- while Lockheed Martin's F-16 was one of the
competitors -- the U.S. company had urged the GOB consider
the purchase of used F-16s as a significantly less costly
option to the F-X. Although an attempt by Lockheed-Martin in
early 2003 to ally with Varig Engineering and Maintenance
(VEM) for a proposed upgrade of used F-16s fell through, the
company remains upbeat it will be able to partner with a
Brazilian firm (possibly Embraer) to craft an attractive used
aircraft offer. Ultimately, Lockheed Martin believes it can
provide fully capable F-16 aircraft at less than half the
cost of the F-X. (Note: One driving factor, however, will be
the ability of FAB to conduct inter-operable aerial refueling
for any fighter. Brazil is considering purchasing two or
three KC-135s to augment their refueling capability.
Procurement of KC-135s from the U.S. would be a positive
indicator for purchase of used F-16s. End note.)
¶8. (SBU) In recognition that new aircraft will be
unobtainable, senior FAB leadership, including FAB's probable
next Commander in Chief, increasingly have come around to
accepting used F-16s as Brazil's best aircraft option. In
this context, the F-16 appears to have the inside track over
other used aircraft options, although there are rumors that
some in FAB may be looking at procuring used South African
Cheetahs, a modified Mirage III aircraft one generation older
than the early F-16 models. Meanwhile, the Brazilian
Congress which has been absent from the F-X debate, may get
into the picture. In a discussion with emboffs, a prominent
Deputy on the National Defense Committee stated he intended
to hold hearings in 2005 on used fighter aircraft with an eye
to promoting the F-16 as Brazil's best option.
¶9. (C) Comment: We expect that Brazil will continue to
seek the aquisition of high performance jet fighters for
reasons of national pride, if nothing else. U.S. Mission
Brazil will continue to support the used F-16 option as the
most logical way forward both tactically and economically.
An increasing number of FAB generals appear to support this
view. However, even though Brazil has moved forward on the
purchase of other weapons systems, we suspect the GOB may not
agree to purchase the F-16 unless it achieves an adequate
comfort level on all aspects of the bilateral pol-mil
relationship. As Brazil observes the bite that ASPA is
taking on countries that do not sign Article 98 agreements,
it questions about the reliability of the U.S. as a
supplier/strategic partner will continue, thus further
complicating the used F-16 aquisition option.
Danilovich