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Viewing cable 09MEXICO283, THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MEXICO283 | 2009-02-04 17:05 | 2011-03-02 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/la-relacion-eu-mexico-mas-fuerte-que-nunca |
VZCZCXRO3019
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041708Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
190450
2009-02-04 17:08:00
09MEXICO283
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO3019
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041708Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000283
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR KJUS PINR MX
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,
TAPPING OPPORTUNITIES IN 2009--SECURITY AND REFORM
Classified By: POLCOUNS CHARLES V. BARCLAY. REASONS 1.4(b)
and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Mexico's drug cartels are responsible for
60-80 percent of the cocaine and a significant percentage of
other drugs entering the U.S., their activities corrupt
Mexican institutions, foment insecurity throughout Mexico,
and instigate rising violence on the U.S.-Mexico border.
Disrupting and ultimately dismantling these groups represents
one of our Mission's highest priorities. To achieve that
objective, we need to help Mexico build stronger law
enforcement institutions committed to working together not
only to attack the cartels from without but corruption from
within. We also must help Mexico improve its ability to
collect and then act expeditiously on intelligence. Mexico
is looking for much from us in terms of combating U.S. drug
demand, trafficking of arms from the U.S. into Mexico, and
money laundering in the U.S. and we need to step up our
efforts across the board. Last, but not least, we need to
assist Mexico in implementing justice reform that will enable
Mexico to turn the page on corruption and establish the rule
of law. The Merida Initiative provides a platform for
achieving these objectives provided it remains flexible yet
focused. This cable is the first in a series of five cables
that aim to define the issues that will shape the U.S.-Mexico
relationship in the coming year. End Summary.
Reinforce President Calderon's Commitment to Law Enforcement
Development
¶2. (SBU) The Mexican public correctly perceives Mexican law
enforcement institutions as widely inept and corrupt.
Calderon's own security chief highlighted a recent federal
review in which 56,000 police officers failed to meet minimum
professional standards. We must ensure that the Merida
Initiative's focus on police training and vetting not only
professionalizes and sanitizes Mexico's police forces, but
reinforces Calderon's goal of ending impunity. As Merida
moves forward, we need to encourage the GOM to establish
aggressive internal affairs units to better identify and
sanction bad cops, as well as map out a career path for law
enforcement officials that rewards good ones with advancement
and better pay.
Encourage Better Inter-Institutional Cooperation
¶3. (U) The major institutions engaged in Mexico's war on
drugs -- the military, public security, the Attorney
General's office, and the national security intelligence arm,
on down to the state and municipal law enforcement community
-- don't trust each other. In principle, the GOM aims to
promote greater interoperability through its
information-sharing initiative Plataforma Mexico; so far,
however, each agency has continued to pursue leads and
conduct investigations independent of, if not at odds with,
its counterparts. On an institutional level, the Attorney
General's Office (PGR) is resisting the Secretariat of Public
Security's (SSP) efforts to integrate the Federal
Investigative Agency (AFI) officials into its forces and
opposition parties in Congress have raised their own
objections to legislation that would call for the merging of
SSP and AFI into a single unitary federal police force.
¶4. (SBU) Ongoing U.S. funded vetting programs have
facilitated the creation of trusted units within several of
Mexico's law enforcement entities. The Merida Initiative
will fund vetting programs on a far more extensive level.
Recently adopted legislation calls for the creation of a
National Council for Public Security which the president will
head and will include the ministries of government, public
security, national defense and the navy. However, it would
be a mistake to regard this council as the panacea for the
deep-seated distrust that presently characterizes relations.
The Merida planning process was instrumental in bringing
Mexico's poorly coordinated law enforcement elements to the
same table. We must continue to use it as a way to promote
greater trust and interoperability among Mexico's federal law
enforcement elements; at the same time, we must ensure that
future Merida programs are designed to undermine reflexive
parochialism here and maximize cooperation and
interoperability.
Enhance Intelligence Collection and Sharing
¶5. (C) Mexico's current intelligence collection
capabilities are limited. CISEN is primarily focused on
terrorist threats and domestic subversion issues. The
military remains largely concentrated on collecting against
the EPR and other domestic threats. Mexico's intelligence
organs are only beginning to develop expertise in targeting
Mexico's cartels. As our trust in vetted units has grown
over the past ten years our law enforcement community has
begun to share compartmentalized intelligence with Mexican
counterparts and helped them take down key targets. In
September 2008, SEMAR signed a General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and in October 2008, NORTHCOM
J2 visited SEMAR for an unprecedented intelligence sharing
conference centering on counter narcotics and
counterterrorism.
¶6. (C) We now want to capitalize on the Secretariat of
National Defense's (SEDENA) expressed interest in securing a
similar agreement and hope to sign one in Summer 2009. A
high priority, however, will be to implement and
operationalize both agreements by bringing Mexico's fledgling
collection efforts up to speed through training and best
practice sharing, ensuring that shared intelligence is
properly handled and ensuring as well that actionable
intelligence results in action.
Engage the Enemy on Our Side of the Border
¶7. (SBU) The U.S.- Mexico law enforcement partnership has
already accelerated success in terms of high level captures
and extraditions of major drug traffickers in Mexico. The
GOM and Mexican public appreciate the helping hand we are
extending through the Merida Initiative, but expect us to
take actions on our side of the border. The U.S. is putting
considerable efforts into targeting money launderers in the
U.S., curbing our drug demand, and more effectively impeding
the flow of weapons into Mexico. ICE and ATF are looking at
a "surge" in personnel and resources to respond to rising
concerns about criminal activities in the border region. We
need to explore ways to build on these initiatives with
sufficient funding and resources to ensure our efforts match
those of the GOM.
Broaden Judicial Reform Effort
¶8. (SBU) Putting in place genuine judicial reform is one of
the single most important pre-requisites to Mexico's long
term ability to gain the upper hand over organized crime,
turn the page on corruption and establish the rule of law.
The Merida Initiative's significant funding for judicial
reform here offers us leverage not only to encourage passage
of appropriate legislation, but provide necessary training to
fully implement laws once they are passed.
¶9. (C) The judicial reform bill passed last June mandating
Mexico's shift to an accusatory system over the next eight
years is welcome. However, before this and other reforms of
Mexico's antiquated judicial system can take effect, the
Mexican Congress needs to overhaul the federal procedural and
penal codes, among other laws. We are discreetly working
with some members of Congress on a draft and have offered to
assist PGR with Calderon administration's proposals, which
for the most part continue to be drafted internally with
minimal input from non-GOM entities.
¶10. (SBU) Legislative efforts to date provide an excellent
start, but Mexican prosecutors need additional tools to
alleviate a massive case overload in the courts and allow
authorities to gain the cooperation of lower level defendants
to build cases against organized crime leaders. While not a
panacea, plea bargaining and other arrangements and other
mechanisms for pre-trial disposition of cases will go a long
way to alleviating over-crowded judicial dockets and giving
prosecutors the tools they need to get criminal defendants to
help identify, investigate and prosecute their associates and
bosses. Once these reforms are passed, we will help the PGR
develop and implement these mechanisms through our training
programs.
¶11. (SBU) A robust asset forfeiture regime will also be
crucial to hitting Mexico's cartels where it hurts, but it
remains to be seen whether Mexico can pass and implement
legislation that is up to the task. The Calderon
administration has presented to Congress a strong asset
forfeiture bill (based on Colombia's "Extincion de Dominio"
law, which the USG helped draft and implement), but general
distrust of government may result in a weakened version. The
bill will be taken up during an abbreviated legislative
session this winter. Working closely with Attorney General's
office, we will use what may be a short-window to encourage a
law with sufficient teeth.
¶12. (C) Comment: Failure to successfully implement
Calderon's broad reform agenda will undercut Mexico's long
term efforts to transform the judicial system and give its
law enforcement community more effective tools for its
campaign against organized crime. The Merida Initiative
provides funding to promote such reforms, mostly through
training, and the Mission country team is well-positioned to
influence both their design and implementation. To be sure,
the weight of responsibility for adopting new reforms and
ensuring existing ones take effect falls on the Mexican
government. For its part, Washington can support this
process by ensuring our resource base remains robust in
coming years -- and by devoting greater resources and focus
to areas of outstanding Mexican concern, such as illegal arms
trafficking and bulk cash smuggling.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT