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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI192, FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID REF: A) TRIPOLI 133, B) TRIPOLI 0001, C) TRIPOLI 0068, D) 08 TRIPOLI 699, E) TRIPOLI 186 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI192 | 2009-02-27 13:01 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
P 271312Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0705
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1019
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5083
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000192
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER, SWEET), NEA/PI
(BOURGEOIS)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2019
TAGS: ECON SOCI KCOR KDEM ELAB PGOV PHUM LY
SUBJECT: FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID REF: A) TRIPOLI 133, B) TRIPOLI 0001, C) TRIPOLI 0068, D) 08 TRIPOLI 699, E) TRIPOLI 186 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: Ordinary Libyans, frustrated by privations during the country's isolation under sanctions and exhausted by decades of largely failed political adventurism under the rubric of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution, appear to care more about economic reform than political change. Historically entrepeneurial, al-Qadhafi's revolution had been a "poor fit" for most Libyans. The lifting of sanctions and nascent economic reforms were a welcome relief; however, the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford (the majority are still employed by the government) has remained a problem. Static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples, have hit ordinary Libyans hard in the last two years. The tendency of greedy regime elites to monopolize the most lucrative market sectors has had political consequences, and the pervasive culture of rent-seeking that evolved during the sanctions period, together with conspicuous consumption by regime elites, has not sat well with the silent majority of Libyans, who remain socially conservative. The fact that many young men are forced by lack of means to delay marriage is another pressing economic issue in a conservative society in which marriage is a key social anchor and indicator of status. Embassy contacts in Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk were cautiously optimistic about proposals for wealth distribution and continued economic reform, but less sanguine about proposed government re-structuring and political change. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. End summary. LIBYANS CARE MORE ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM THAN POLITICAL CHANGE
2.(C) As reported ref A, Libya appears to be in one of its intermittent periods of intense political foment. As debate in the externally-based opposition press and Libya's small indigenous elite swirls around proposed wealth distribution, government re-structuring, possible adoption of a constitution and the ostensible withdrawal from politics by presumed heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, ordinary Libyans have largely eschewed politics and remained primarily focused on improving their daily standard of living. xxxxxxxxxxxx recently told P/E Chief that ordinary Libyans had been frustrated by years of sanctions-imposed privations and, more recently, by the disparity between increased availability of consumer goods and their stagnant salaries. Exhausted by years of largely failed political adventurism under the auspices of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution and the Jamahiriya (state of the masses), most Libyans do not really care about politics or political reform. "Do not give us free speech, parties, a constitution or elections - give us the ability to make and freely spend money", he said. REVOLUTION A "POOR FIT" FOR HISTORICALLY ENTREPENEURIAL LIBYANS
3.(C) In a conservative society dominated by tribes, Libyans are primarily focused on providing for their families. Drawing an analogy with Russia, xxxxxxxxxxxx said that Libyans would remain politically quiescent as long as economic conditions were "acceptable", but cautioned that "poverty is real" in Libya and that maintaining the perception of an improved daily quality of life for people was a serious political imperative for Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime. (Note: Despite the country's oil wealth, some internal government reports reportedly suggest that as many as a third of Libya's estimated one million families live at or below the poverty line. End note.) Laughingly referring to the Barbary corsairs, xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that Libyans were historically entrepeneurial and characterized the period of revolutionary zeal in Libya between the late 1970's and early 1990's as a "poor fit" for them. Masters of tactical maneuvering and operating with tight margins, xxxxxxxxxxxx said Libyan businessmen only needed a small window in which to flourish- the recent relaxation of rules still on the books prohibiting private ownership and governing profits had been enough to prompt a flood of consumer goods by comparison with what had been on offer only four or five years ago. DISPARITY BETWEEN INCREASED CONSUMER PRODUCTS ON OFFER AND STATIC SALARIES
4.(C) A significant danger, though, was the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford. The combination of static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples (ref B), have hit ordinary Libyan families hard in the last two years. (Note: More than 60 percent of Libya's workforce are public sector employees with salaries that have not changed in years, and some 250,000 of them draw salaries but do not work, according to the minister-equivalent for Manpower, Employment and Training. Overall inflation for 2007 was 6.3 percent and 12 percent for 2008; foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco increased by 16.4 percent. End note.) The tendency of avaricious regime elites to monopolize the most lucrative market sectors (ref C) was another economic risk with attendant political consequences. (Note: Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index put Libya at 126 among the 180 countries it rated. As a point of reference, Nigeria ranked 121st. End note.) The pervasive culture of rent-seeking that had flourished during the lean sanctions period, together with the ostentatious consumerism of the regime elite, did not sit well with the silent majority of Libyans, most of whom remained conservative. SOCIAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS A COMPLICATION IN A SOCIALLY CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY
5.(C) Comments by xxxxxxxxxxxx echo xxxxxxxxxxxx's analysis. The owner of xxxxxxxxxxxx suffers from rheumatism-related medical complaints for which treatment is unavailable in Tripoli. He must travel regularly to Tunis for costly treatment, a signficant expense. Neither of his two adult sons - both in their late 20's - has full-time work. One is married; the other is not. xxxxxxxxxxxx's small pension from a former government job and modest income from the store support him, his wife, their younger daughters (who are school-aged) and his adult sons. Although they believe him to be too anxious to appease western countries and too glib, xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx have expressed support for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his proposed political and economic reforms; however, they readily concede that they would be willing to forego political reform in exchange for more income and greater stability in terms of services provided by the state. They, like many other middle and lower-class Libyans, fear that proposed government re-structuring, which would include dismantling many existing ministry-equivalents (including those for health and education), would mean a lesser quality of life in at least the near to mid-term. While they are intrigued by the proposal to distribute oil wealth directly to Libyan citizens, they have little expectation that such will actually occur. If it were to happen, many believe that the proposed stipends would not be sufficient to defray the costs of paying for services like education and health care, which would be privatized.
6.(C) The owner of xxxxxxxxxxxx in the eastern city of Benghazi shares those concerns about proposed privatization, but is willing to give it a try if the government would actually reduce its role in the lives of ordinary Libyans. Paraphrasing Muammar al-Qadhafi's remarks about the U.S. during his Revolution Day speech last August (ref D), our contact said he wanted the government " ... to be neither friend nor enemy, but merely to leave us alone". Noting that Libyans, particularly those in eastern Libyan, had a long history as successful traders and highlighting the failure of the Jamahiriya to either efficiently distribute oil wealth or develop other economic sectors, he said the sooner further privatization occurred, the better. He, too, was willing to forego political reform - "I don't give a damn about politics" - in exchange for continued economic reform. A xxxxxxxxxxxx in the eastern city of Tobruk echoed those sentiments. Asked about proposed government re-structuring, he was dismissive. The regime, in his view, was a police state and could not be expected to willingly concede political authority. His primary concern was that his four sons xxxxxxxxxxxx had not been able to earn enough to get married. Like many Middle Eastern countries, it is expected that grooms and their families will provide fully furnished homes for newly-married couples. Increased expectations about what that means - modern appliances are expensive - have made it increasingly difficult for young men to save enough to marry, delaying the age at which they do so. In a conservative society in which marriage constitutes an important social anchor and bellwether of worth, that trend has worrying social consequences.
7.(C) Comment: As reported ref E, proposed direct distribution of oil wealth to the people - an idea floated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March that has captured the popular imagination - dominated the recently concluded session of the Basic People's Congresses. An attendant proposal to dismantle most ministry-equivalents and privatize a large number of services currently managed and provided by the government was given relatively short shrift. The focus on wealth distribution reflects the fact that ordinary Libyans, exhausted by the pervasive chaos that has characterized al-Qadhafi's regime and its successive political-economic experiments, are frustrated by politics and seek the comfort of a marginally better day-to-day quality of life. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. All eyes are now on the upcoming session of the General People's Congress, expected to convene early next week. End comment. CRETZ