Currently released so far... 5268 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MONTERREY411, OUTGOING MAYORS SPEAK ON THREATS FROM ORGANIZED CRIME;
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MONTERREY411.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MONTERREY411 | 2009-10-30 18:06 | 2011-02-10 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Monterrey |
Appears in these articles: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/02/10/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol |
VZCZCXRO5071
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0411/01 3031829
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301829Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4062
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5142
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9680
232351
2009-10-30 18:29:00
09MONTERREY411
Consulate Monterrey
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO5071
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0411/01 3031829
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301829Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4062
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5142
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9680
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONTERREY 000411
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: KCRM KCOR ASEC SNAR PHUM PGOV MX
SUBJECT: OUTGOING MAYORS SPEAK ON THREATS FROM ORGANIZED CRIME;
LOCAL CONSULTANT CALLS FOR TARGETED ACTION AGAINST COMMON CRIME
MONTERREY 00000411 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: During separate conversations with Consul
General, two outgoing Mayors briefed us on threats they had
received from narcotraffickers during their tenure. The worst
instance involved armed sicarios who stormed into one mayor's
city hall office and demanded that he stop resisting their
dictates. Meanwhile, a Monterrey-based security consultant told
PolOffs on October 23 that he was frustrated by the state of
Nuevo Leon's delay in adopting a security proposal that had
garnered positive results in Sonora. His approach involves
public release of common crime statistics and significant
community involvement. He criticized efforts by new State
Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Carlos Jauregui Hintze to
weed out police corruption before tackling escalating crime
rates and called for state authorities to expand the release of
crime statistics. End Summary.
Outgoing Mayors Depart the Pressure-cooker
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) During the past few weeks, Consul General spoke with the
mayors of four Monterrey region municipalities, all of whom
expressed relief that their terms were ending October 31 given
the pressure they were under from organized crime. Rafael Paz,
the Mayor of Santiago, a suburban city south of Monterrey,
painted the clearest picture of the situation he had faced. He
stated that during his three year term he:
--- Had been threatened by narco-traffickers in the presence
of the written and broadcast press;
--- Had been confronted by an armed group of narco-gunmen
which burst into his city hall office demanding that he stop
resisting their demands. (Per the Mayor, he was told "they're
200 of us and only 9 on you security detail; who do you think
is going to win?"
--- Had the military raid a kidnapper's safe house several
doors away from his home; and
--- Had received telephone threats from the Zetas threatening
to kill him and take his decapitated head to his wheelchair
bound spouse.
¶3. (C) Paz recognized that his police force had been thoroughly
penetrated by the narco-traffickers, pointing out that his
municipal Secretary for Public Security had been detained by
military and state authorities and had subsequently confessed.
However, he felt that the narco-traffickers focus upon him was
because the municipality had begun to sell land tracts and an
unexpected rush of potential buyers, with pockets full of cash,
wanted to buy the plots. Paz had refused some offers (in one
case, an interested buyer sought to pay 25 percent in cash for a
95 million peso property) due to his suspicions of money
laundering.
¶4. (C) Outgoing San Pedro Mayor Fernando Margain Berlanga has
also faced difficulties, although not as severe as Paz.
Margain's challenge has been how to deal with several notorious
night clubs which have become centers for drug-dealing. While
the city has mandated closing times, in practice the clubs don't
close on time because the gangsters frequenting these
establishments don't let that happen. City efforts to shut down
the clubs have faltered as club owners have gotten federal
injunctions allowing them to continue doing business. For his
trouble, Margain has received implicit and explicit telephone
threats.
Security Program Lacks Traction
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) In an October 23 meeting, security consultant Santiago
Roel told PolOffs that the State of Nuevo Leon had yet to
implement fully a crime prevention program similar to one in
Sonora that had significantly reduced many common crimes there.
Roel, a private consultant who designed the Sonora program,
uses traffic lights, "semaforos," to indicate if a particular
crime statistic has reached a target reduction percentage.
(Note: Green signals that crime rates are at or below a
predetermined goal, red that crime rates have risen above
historical averages, and yellow that the statistics are
in-between.) Roel's program also involves citizen and
government participation in weekly meetings to discuss publicly
released crime statistics, broken down by individual police
districts. Citizen groups hold police officials accountable for
failing to reduce criminal activities in their districts.
¶6. (C) Based on his observations, organized crime has more
heavily infiltrated the Nuevo Leon state police than Sonora's
state police. Even so, he believes the Nuevo Leon police
situation is salvageable. In the Monterrey metro area, Roel has
MONTERREY 00000411 002.2 OF 003
targeted the suburbs of San Pedro, San Nicolas and Guadalupe as
initial candidates for his program. He said he refused to work
with the suburb of Apodaca after the city's police chief
confided to him that he has no control over his police force.
Semaforos Incorporated
----------------------
¶7. (C) Roel explained that public pressure had forced the
previous Nuevo Leon state administration to accept the semaforo
indicators, but the state had not incorporated any of the other
elements of his program, which he judged key to success. Former
Nuevo Leon Governor Jose Natividad Gonzales Paras had opposed
his program, he stated. While new governor Rodrigo Medina de la
Cruz has been supportive of his initiative, the state has yet to
implement his full program. Real reform, he noted, requires the
support of the Citizen's Councils for Public Safety.
State Approach Needs Reform
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Roel said he believed the state's new Secretary of
Public Security (SSP), Carlos Jauregui Hintze, had good
intentions, but was hampered by a corrupt police organization
and opined that Jauregui has taken the wrong approach by
initially attempting to weed out corruption instead of reduce
crime. He pointed out that the state police also have
jurisdiction in part of Monterrey, which dilutes the
organization's focus and efficacy. The State police, he
recommended, should return control of the city to the municipal
police and focus 80 percent of their activities on prevention
instead of reaction, as he said was currently the case.
¶9. (C) Criticizing the state's emphasis on a "top-down" control
system, he explained that crime reduction requires an inverse
approach - active participation by citizens and district police
units to help calibrate law enforcement activities at a local
level. Unlike Sonora, Nuevo Leon has not broken down crime
statistics to the degree where authorities can use them to
identify crime rates at the community level. Doing so would
help assign responsibility for underperforming geographical
areas and political subdivisions. Roel opined that Jauregui was
trying to emulate federal Secretary of Public Security Jorge
Tello's method of exerting central control over police, instead
of tailoring police actions to the needs of neighborhoods.
The Way Forward
---------------
¶10. (C) Any program to address corruption must have support at
the top and offer a mechanism for accountability, Roel said.
His approach would identify specific geographical areas and, by
association, those who were responsible for either good or bad
outcomes. Roel noted that, based on his Sonora experience, it
becomes readily apparent where the problems are after analyzing
the statistics at the neighborhood level. In Sonora, he said,
the state focused on those 20 percent of the geographic areas
where 80 percent of all crimes occurred.
¶11. (C) He pointed out that some crimes, such as car theft, are
good indicators of corruption in a political subdivision,
because this type of crime requires a sophisticated distribution
network. Collusion by public authorities is usually necessary
for this type of crime to flourish. Roel's strategy involves
establishing accountability, publishing and widely disseminating
crime statistics, publically announcing crime reduction goals
and involving civil society groups along with local and federal
police authorities in the process. He would expand this to all
11 political subdivisions in the Monterrey area. Roel
emphasized that authorities can quickly reduce crimes such as
domestic violence, rape and sexual assault by focusing on
problematic communities and releasing targeted statistics.
Often, the statistics alone are enough to generate positive
community action.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) While Roel is clearly trying to sell his consultancy
services, he does have an impressive track record in Sonora. He
notes that, while using his program, that state reduced rape by
26 percent, domestic violence 34 percent, robbery 30 percent,
house breaking 22 percent and assault 17 percent. While he is
eager to tout his success in Sonora, Roel is clearly nervous
about associating his efforts with operations against organized
crime, quickly declaring to PolOffs that his operations did not
MONTERREY 00000411 003.2 OF 003
target cartel activity. Roel was highly critical of San Pedro
municipal authorities, who he claimed, refused to heed his
advice. Indeed, Roel is a vocal member of the local San Pedro
Citizen's Security Council and that body has engaged in a
long-running debate as to whether to emphasize Roel's strategy
or state Public Security Secretary Jauregui's current approach
of trying to weed out corruption before addressing local crime
rates. Fellow Council member Mauricio Ramos Pons, a former
security chief for the Monterrey-based multinational ALFA
corporation, has argued just as persuasively that ensuring that
local police forces are reliable, honest, and well-motivated and
well-trained is the most important goal to be pursued. Clearly
both need to be done, but the difficult question that must be
answered is which should have a higher priority.
¶13. (SBU) Roel, 52, is a forthright and self-assured
interlocutor. He began as a government consultant in the early
1990s, but did not address security issues until the latter part
of the decade. In addition to his consulting business, he is a
residential real estate developer, rents vacation properties,
and runs a call-center software company. Roel has a law degree
from the Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon, an MBA from
Monterrey TEC and has done post-graduate studies at Harvard's
John F. Kennedy School.
WILLIAMSONB